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Abstract
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a key technology for next generation wireless networks and
provide a low-cost and convenient solution to the last-mile problem. Security and privacy issues are of paramount
importance to WMNs for their wide deployment and for supporting service-oriented applications. Moreover, to
support real-time services, WMNs must also be equipped with secure, reliable, and efficient routing protocols.
Therefore, a number of research studies have been devoted to privacy-preserving routing protocols in WMNs.
However, these studies cannot defend against inside attacks effectively, often take it for granted that every internal
node is cooperative and trustworthy, and rarely consider dividing the user privacy information into different
categories according to the security requirements. To address these issues, we propose a Privacy-Aware Secure
Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (PA-SHWMP), which combines a new dynamic reputation mechanism based on
subject logic and uncertainty with the multi-level security technology. PA-SHWMP can defend against the internal
attacks caused by compromised nodes and achieve stronger security and privacy protection while maintaining
reasonable balances between security and performance. We analyze the PA-SHWMP protocol in terms of security,
privacy, and performance. The simulation results show that the packet delivery ratio of the proposed PA-SHWMP
becomes better than that of the existing HWMP and SHWMP protocols, when the number of malicious nodes and
the percentage of lossy links increase. Moreover, the convergence time of PA-SHWMP is smaller than HWMP and
SHWMP with any percentage of malicious mesh routers.
Keywords: privacy protection, wireless mesh networks, routing
1. Introduction
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a key
technology for the next generation wireless network and
provide a low-cost and convenient solution to high-speed
Internet access and applications such as web surfing,
e-banking, e-commerce, teleconferencing, etc. [1,2].
WMNs consist of mesh routers (i.e., nodes) and mesh
clients (i.e., users), where the mesh routers form the
wireless backbone network and interwork with the
wired network to provide multi-hop wireless high-band-
width connectivity to mesh clients. Mesh clients connect
directly to the routers or form wireless adhoc networks
to extend the wireless connectivity [3]. Figure 1 shows
the network architecture of a 802.11s WMN [4]. A
mesh point (MP) is an IEEE 802.11s entity that mainly
acts as a relay mesh router. A mesh access point (MAP)
is an MP that can also work as an access point. A wire-
less mobile station (STA) acts as a mesh client and is
connected to an MAP through generic WLAN proto-
cols. Mesh portal is also an MP that has a bridging
functionality connecting the mesh network to other net-
works such as a traditional 802.11 WLAN or a non-
802.11 network and acts as the gateway router to the
WMN infrastructure. WMNs have the advantages of
low costs, self-organization, auto-configuration, good
scalability, high robustness, etc.
Security and privacy issues are of paramount impor-
tance to WMNs for their wide deployment. In WMNs,
there are two types of privacy concerns: data- and con-
text-oriented concerns. Data-oriented concerns focus on
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protecting the privacy of data content collected from, or
query posted to, a WMN. On the other hand, context-
oriented concerns concentrate on protecting contextual
information, such as the location and timing of traffic
flows in a WMN [5]. Both privacy concerns may be vio-
lated by data and traffic analysis attacks. As illustrated
in Figure 2, in data analysis attacks, a malicious mesh
router decrypts data to compromise the payload being
transmitted. In traffic analysis attacks, a third-party
adversary eavesdrops the wirelessly transmitted data and
tracks the traffic flow hop-by-hop [5].
Data- and context-oriented privacy concerns may both
be threatened by external and internal adversaries.
External adversary eavesdrops the data communication
between mesh routers in a WMN. Internal adversary is
a participating mesh router captured and manipulated
by malicious entities to compromise private information.
External adversary can be effectively defended against by
the traditional cryptographic encryption and authentica-
tion techniques. As to internal adversary, since a partici-
pating mesh router is allowed to decrypt data legally,
the traditional encryption and authentication techniques
may no longer be effective.
To address the aforementioned privacy protection chal-
lenge and to support real-time applications and smooth
delivery of broadband services, WMNs must also be
equipped with secure, reliable, and efficient routing pro-
tocols. However, security in routing or forwarding func-
tionality is not specified in 802.11s-based WMN. The
study in [4] identifies that existing Hybrid Wireless Mesh
Figure 1 Architecture of a 802.11s WMN.
Figure 2 Privacy attacks in WMNs.
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Protocol (HWMP) is vulnerable to various types of rout-
ing attacks. The main reason is that the intermediate
mesh routers need to modify routing messages before
forwarding and re-broadcasting them. Furthermore, due
to the intrinsically open and distributed nature, WMNs
are subject to various attacks from inside [3,6].
In this article, we propose a Privacy-Aware Secure
Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (PA-SHWMP), which
combines a new dynamic reputation mechanism based
on subject logic [7,8] and uncertainty [9] with multilevel
security (MLS) technology [10,11].
PA-SHWMP is an improvement of SHWMP intro-
duced by Islam et al. [4]. SHWMP uses cryptographic
extensions to provide authenticity and integrity to
HWMP routing messages and prevents unauthorized
manipulation of mutable fields in the routing information
elements. However, SHWMP is vulnerable to the attacks
launched by the internal legitimate mesh routers. First, it
assumes that all internal mesh routers cooperate with
each other without interrupting the operation of proto-
col. Second, SHWMP uses a hop-by-hop authentication
mechanism to provide security of the routing messages.
Each mesh router decrypts received packets and re-
encrypts them using its own key. In this scheme, the user
privacy information is partly protected from eavesdrop-
pers but known by mesh routers because of routing in
the mesh backbone. Thus, an active attacker can compro-
mise and control mesh routers to get the user privacy
information. Different from SHWMP, PA-SHWMP relies
on a hybrid usage of reputation mechanism built by sub-
ject logic and user privacy information classification
mechanism according to MLS. By providing scalable
security services to assure the authenticity, integrity, and
secrecy of routing messages, PA-SHWMP can defend
against the internal attacks caused by compromised mesh
routers and achieve stronger security and privacy protec-
tion while maintaining reasonable balance between
security and performance.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. We dis-
cuss a related study in Section 2. Introductions to subject
logic and MLS are described in Section 3. Subsequently,
the implementation of PA-SHWMP is given in Section 4.
After that, the security and performance analysis are
given in Section 5 and 6, respectively. Finally, we draw
the concluding remarks in Section 7.
2. Related study
WMNs have become an important focus area of research
owing to their promise in providing high-speed wireless
connectivity everywhere and realizing numerous next-gen-
eration wireless services. Recently, research in WMNs has
focused on developing high performance communication
protocols. However, given the wireless and multi-hop
nature of communication, WMNs are subject to a wide
range of security and privacy threats.
Therefore, designing a secure, efficient, and privacy-
protection routing protocol for WMNs is a big challenging
task. So far, there has been tremendous research on secure
routing for wireless networks such as adhoc networks or
wireless sensor networks. However, they cannot provide
specific security features for mesh networks and are still
vulnerable to various types of routing attacks such as gray
hole, route re-direction, spoofing, etc [12].
Capkun et al. [13] proposed a privacy-preserving
scheme for hybrid adhoc networks, which are exactly
WMNs. In the proposed scheme, each mobile node uses
temporary public key pairs to establish pairwise secrets
with its neighbors and the pairwise secrets in turn are
used to build secure route. The scheme is unlikely to pro-
vide privacy protection for two reasons. First, some user
privacy information has to be disclosed to access points,
which makes malicious access point be able to track a
specific mobile user. Second, within a time slot the pseu-
donyms of source and destination keep unchanged, so an
adversary can link messages by them. Wu and Li [14]
introduced a new structure named as “Onion ring” for
WMNs. The scheme uses “Onion encryption” in a ring
structure to avoid an adversary to distinguish the source
and the destination nodes and to identify the misbehav-
ing mesh routers. However, how to anonymously build
the ring in the first place is not mentioned and topology
dynamics may make it inefficient. In [15], a penalty-based
shortest path routing protocol is proposed to achieve
well-maintained balance between network performance
and traffic privacy preservation. The scheme is only
designed to use multiple paths for data delivery so that
an adversary who is only able to observe a fraction of the
traffic cannot obtain any meaningful information [3].
Samad and Makram [16] proposed a protected neighbor-
hood-based trust mechanism in clustered WMNs. The
mechanism is based on neighborhood trust to gain
required security and identification privacy in a clustered
WMN. However, some privacy information of users has
to be disclosed to the relay mesh routers, which makes
malicious mesh routers be able to get the privacy infor-
mation. Ren et al. [17] proposed PEACE, a novel privacy-
enhanced yet accountable security framework, tailored
for WMNs. PEACE is presented as a suite of authentica-
tion and key agreement protocols built upon short group
signature variation. However, PEACE only secures the
network from external attacks and takes it for granted
that every internal node is cooperative and trustworthy.
Sen [18] presented an efficient and reliable routing proto-
col that also provides user anonymity in WMNs. By
robust estimation wireless link quality and the available
bandwidth in the wireless route and exploiting the
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benefits of using multi-point relays and circular routing
technique, the protocol is able to sustain a high level of
throughput with a low control overhead. The user priv-
acy is protected by using a novel anonymized authentica-
tion protocol. However, the proposed routing protocol
cannot defend against inside attacks, in which two mali-
cious nodes advertise in such a way as if they have a very
reliable link between them.
From the analysis above, it can be summarized that
the aforementioned work cannot effectively solve the
privacy-related security problem of WMNs. What’s
more, the intrinsically open and distributed nature of
WMNs raise some new privacy security challenges
caused by inside attacks, which are neglected by the pre-
vious studies.
3. Preliminaries
This section briefly describes subject logic and MLS
used in PA-SHWMP.
3.1. Subject logic
Most of the routing protocols in WMNs assume that
mesh routers are cooperative and trustworthy. In fact,
some routers in WMNs behave maliciously by eaves-
dropping and decrypting the wirelessly transmitted data,
which will cause a great threat on user’s privacy and can
lead to devastating consequences. Also, they behave self-
ishly by dropping packets originating from other mesh
routers and only forwarding its own packets, to increase
their share of available bandwidth. Consequently, it is
necessary to develop some mechanisms to detect and
isolate selfish and malicious nodes.
Reputation scheme is one of the techniques adopted
to detect and isolate selfish and malicious nodes in
WMNs. In reputation-based schemes, a node’s behavior
is measured by its neighbors using a watchdog mechan-
ism [9]. However, cooperative nodes sometimes are per-
ceived as being selfish or malicious due to unreliable
transmission in wireless networks. To deal with this
issue, Jøsang et al. [19] proposed a method based on
subjective logic for discovering trust networks between
specific parties and Kane and Browne [7] successfully
transplanted and applied subjective logic to a wireless
network environment.
Derived from the Dempster-Shafer theory [20] and
with the ability to explicitly represent and manage a
node’s uncertainty, subjective logic emerges as an attrac-
tive tool for handling trust relationships in WMNs. Sub-
jective logic represents a specific belief calculus that
uses a belief metric called opinion to express subjective
beliefs. In subjective logic [7,8], each opinion is denoted
by a 4-tuple ωx:y = (bx:y, dx:y, ux:y, ax:y), where bx:y repre-
sents node x’s belief in node y, dx:y represents node x’s
disbelief in node y, ux:y represents node x’s uncertainty
in node y, and the base rate ax:y represents node x’s will-
ingness to believe node y, which determines how uncer-
tainty is viewed as belief when the opinion is used. They
satisfy the following conditions:{
bx:y + dx:y + ux:y = 1.0
bx:y, dx:y, ux:y, ax:y ∈ [0.0, 1.0]
(1)
The opinion space can be mapped into the interior of an
isosceles triangle, where, for an opinion ωx = (bx, dx, ux,
ax), the three parameters bx, dx, and ux determine the posi-
tion of the vertices accordingly. Figure 3 illustrates an
example where the opinion about a proposition x from a
binary state space with the value ωx = (0.7, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5)
[7].
Belief and disbelief can be calculated by the collected
evidence. The uncertainty reflects the confidence in node
x’s knowledge on node y; an uncertainty of 1.0 represents
that a node has no basis for any conclusions. The base
rate represents node x’s willingness to believe node y,
which determines how uncertainty is viewed as belief
when the opinion is used. When an opinion is used in a
decision, it is projected onto the belief/disbelief axis
through its expectation E(ωx:y) = bx:y+ax:yux:y. A base rate
of 0.0 causes uncertainty viewed as disbelief, while a base
rate of 1.0 causes uncertainty viewed as belief. A base rate
of 0.5 causes uncertainty viewed positively as actual belief.
In this article, we will use a base rate of 0.5, so that
unknown nodes are by default assigned a median level
of trust. For example, if an opinion is (0.6, 0.2, 0.2, 0.5),
its expectation can be calculated as E(ωx:y) = bx:y+ax:yux:y
= 0.6+0.5*0.2 = 0.7. An entirely uncertain opinion, (0.0,
0.0, 1.0, ax) will always have an expectation equal to the
base rate, as E(ωx:y) = bx:y+ax:yux:y = 0.0+1.0*ax:y = ax:y.
The base rate then becomes the default opinion for
unknown nodes.
3.2. MLS
In Defense Information System Agency (DISA), MLS is
defined as a security system containing information with
different security levels (SLs) and permits for simulta-
neous access by users. MLS systems are considered as
one of the most secured systems, since it has overcome
the operational limitations imposed by system-level
operations. MLS includes five rules as follows [10].
• An information system can store information
about different classifications.
• Users may have different authorizations and need
to know the permits to process information.
• Users cannot access information for which they do
not have authorization, or do not need to know.
• A subject can read from an object only if the sub-
ject’s SL is not lower than the object’s SL.
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• A subject can write to an object only if the sub-
ject’s SL is not higher than the object’s SL.
MLS is applied in various fields including operating
system, database management system, network, as well
as transaction processing and web server. In sum, the
advantages of MLS systems include five aspects as fol-
lows [21,22].
(1) It allows users at each SL to receive appropriate
information.
(2) It protects data from malicious user.
(3) It processes data in secure and appropriate ways.
(4) It delivers data to the correct receiver without
revealing any sensitive information.
(5) It improves system efficiency.
An example of multilevel secure routing is shown in
Figure 4. Source S initiates a packet that is destined to
D and its SL is Second. The packet will be transmitted
following path 1, since only the mesh routers whose SLs
are equal to or higher than the SL of the packet are
allowed to participate in route discovery. On the other
hand, if the packet is classified as Fourth, it will be sent
through path 2, because the mesh routers on path 2
meet the security requirement with shorter distance.
Therefore, packets transmission is not only secure, but
also has various degrees of sensitivity. Hence, the
scheme is able to provide communication that can han-
dle the concept of security classifications.
4. The PA-SHWMP protocol
In this section, we present our privacy-aware secure
routing protocol PA-SHWMP, which aims to provide
privacy protection for WMNs. PA-SHWMP is based on
the current draft version D3.02 [23] of IEEE 802.11s
that introduces the concept of embedded routing in
layer-2 named HWMP, which is a hybrid protocol
because it has combined the flavor of reactive and
proactive routing strategy by employing both on-
demand path selection mode and proactive tree building
mode. On-demand mode allows two MPs to communi-
cate using peer-to-peer paths. On the other hand, proac-
tive tree building mode can be an efficient choice for
nodes in a fixed network topology. In HWMP, both on-
demand and proactive modes can be used simulta-
neously. Figure 5[4] shows the principle of these two
modes.
In PA-SHWMP, the user privacy information is
divided into different categories according to the secur-
ity requirements, which are diverse for different infor-
mation to be transmitted under various circumstances,
or with assorted available resources. Thus, it is able to
provide balance between security and performance. To
achieve the above purpose, a new field, SL as the indica-
tor of security requirements, is added into the routing
header to handle the security classifications for packets.
Routing process is to find the path from source to
destination on which all the mesh routers meet the
security requirements. Besides, to protect routing pack-
ets and user privacy information against attacks
launched by the internal legitimate mesh routers, the
protocol offers a subjective logic-based reputation
mechanism for each mesh router to decide whether to
provide services for incoming packets by querying the
sender’s reputation through their common neighbors
and computing the expectation to estimate whether it is
trustworthy or not.
Figure 3 Opinion triangle with example opinion.
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The proposed scheme has made the following
assumptions [22]:
1. All the packets exchanged through the network
must have an SL which indicates the security require-
ments of the requested route.
2. All mesh routers must have an SL. The mesh router
with a particular SL must only be allowed to transmit
packets at the same level or a lower level.
3. The source may be any one of the participating
mesh routers but can only send a packet with SL not
higher than the SL of the source. This requirement can
avoid bottleneck caused by mesh routers at lower SLs
over-classify their packets with higher SL.
4. Each level is supplied with corresponding weight
security services to assure the authenticity, integrity, and
confidentiality of routing packets.
PA-SHWMP consists of the following three phases:
• security classification and reputation computation;
• packet authentication;
• routing confidentiality.
It is the combination of above mechanisms that pro-
vides expected security and efficiency during route dis-
covery and maintenance. The details of PA-SHWMP are
described next.
4.1. Subjective logic-based reputation scheme
In this article, we propose a novel reputation scheme
which incorporates uncertainty-based subjective logic
into the reputation computing. Also, in order to differ-




























































Figure 5 Principle of HWMP [4].
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due to poor link quality, we integrate link quality into
the proposed scheme.
The contributions of this novel reputation scheme are
(1) it incorporates uncertainty-based subjective logic
into the reputation computation, and detects the exist-
ing selfish and malicious mesh routers in the network.
(2) It assigns the corresponding weight factor to each of
the opinions from recommenders, which makes the final
recommendation results more accurate. (3) It has a
reconfirmation procedure for selfish and malicious mesh
routers, which decreases the false positive rate and
improves the network performance. (4) It makes use of
link quality metric to differentiate between intentional
packet drop and packet drop due to poor link quality.
(1) Quality of wireless links computation
In our scheme, we use the EAR [24] technique for esti-
mating the quality of wireless links by the equation given
as:
di = (1 − α) × di−1 + α × Ns
/
NT (2)
where di is the smoothed delivery ratio, a is the
smoothed constant, 0 <a < 1, Ns is the number of suc-
cessful transmissions during the measurement period of
the ith cycle, NT is the total number of transmissions
during the measurement period of the ith cycle.
All the calculations in our scheme are performed in
time domain. In order to facilitate the analysis and




In WMNs, nodes x and y are two neighboring nodes,
the final opinion of x to y ωfinalx:y includes two compo-
nents. One is the direct opinion ωdirx:y , the other is the
testimonies from other nodes, e.g., the recommended
opinions ωrecx:y .









x:y ) is stored in x’ local reputation
table. Following the direct interaction history, node x com-
putes bdirx:y , d
dir
x:y , and u
dir
x:y . In a measurement period, we let
Tx(y) be the total number of packets node x has trans-
mitted to node y for forwarding, Sx(y) denotes the number
of packets node y has successfully forwarded and Fx(y) be
the number of packets node y has not forwarded. The link
quality between nodes x and y is LQ(x, y), which can be








Tx(y) ∗ LQ(x, y)
)
udirx:y = 1.0 − bx:y − dx:y
(3)
Each node has its direct opinion on others. For an
entirely unknown node or a new node, the default opi-
nion assigned by its neighbors is (0.0, 0.0, 1.0, a).
We classify interactions among nodes into positive
interaction, negative interaction, and uncertain interac-
tion. Each positive or negative interaction increases the
rating of node’s knowledge or decreases uncertainty. The
parameter δÎ[0.0, 1.0] determines how much a rating
change after an individual interaction between nodes. In
the following formulae, we omit the subscript x:y from
each 4-tuple opinion. The direct opinions stored in node
x’s local reputation table are updated through the follow-
ing formulae [7,8]:
This updated mechanism ensures that the direct opi-








x:y ) can be updated in real
time by providing a more precise ωdirx:y for calculation of
ωfinalx:y ; meanwhile, with the increasing of the number of
interactions, the uncertainty value will decrease to zero.
All these can improve the accuracy of isolating untrust-
worthy nodes.
(2) Recommended opinions
When the direct opinion ωdirx:y is not enough for node
x to make a decision about node y, node x solicits the
recommended opinions from their common neighbor
nodes, the neighbor nodes transmit their direct opinions
on node y as the recommended opinions to node x.
Suppose that node x receives a number of n subjective
opinions, known as recommended opinions. Let R
represent the set of recommenders, for each recommen-
der iÎR, we allocate an appropriate weight fi to each







E(ωx:i) = bx:i + ax:iux:i
(4)
Where E(ωx:i) represents x’s belief on i. The larger E
(ωx:i) will make bigger impact on the reputation compu-
tation result. For those untrustworthy nodes, their expec-
tations are very small, so their recommending opinions
will have little impacts on the reputation computation
result, which prevents retaliations or badmouth from
occurring after untrustworthy nodes are rejected.
Recall that the truster x may get recommendations
about the trustee y from many different recommenders.
Then, x’s belief on the recommendation about y is the
average of the belief values of all recommendations and
x’s disbelief is the average of the disbelief values of the
recommendations. The same is true for x’s uncertainty
about the recommendations. Therefore, if there are a
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After getting the direct opinion ωdirx:y and the recom-






































When both the direct opinion ωdirx:y and the recom-
mended opinion ωrecx:y are determined, and the denomi-
nator (udirx:y + u
rec
x:y − udirx:y · urecx:y ) in (6) is zero, we compute
the final opinion ωfinalx:y by (7)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
bfinalx:y = β · bdirx:y + (1 − β) · brecx:y




where b is a weight, which determines how much the




In PA-SHWMP, a trusted identity manager is pre-loaded,
while every participating mesh router pre-loads an iden-
tity table. The identity table provides information about
peering mesh routers in the network. Each entry of the
table describes the identity of a specific mesh router by
binding the following information together with the
mesh router: IP address, SL, public key, and valid time
period. Moreover, the mesh routers at higher SL have
keys related to its own level and all the lower levels. The
trusted identity manager has to reflect the current bind-
ings of mesh routers in the WMNs, and mesh routers
need to contact the identity manager when the service is
available to keep the freshness and correctness of the
identity table. Also, according to aforementioned
assumptions, each mesh router participating in the proto-
col must be assigned a certain SL based on its hierarchic
ranking or the role it plays in WMNs.
(Continued)
If the interaction is a positive interaction, If the interaction is an uncertain interaction,
If u ≥ δ, then If b, d ≥ δ/2, then{
b = b + δ
u = u − δ
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
b = b − δ/2
d = d − δ/2
u = u + δ
Else Else if b <δ/2 and d ≥ δ/2, then⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
b = b + δ





d = d − (δ − b)
u = u + δ
If the interaction is a negative interaction,
If u ≥ δ, then
Else if b ≥ δ/2 and d <δ/2, then
{
d = d + δ
u = u − δ
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
b = b − (δ − d)
d = 0.0
u = u + δ
Else Else if b, d <δ/2, then⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
b = b − (δ − u)
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Appropriate mechanisms should be applied to guaran-
tee the secure communications between mesh routers
and the security manager. However, it is not our con-
cern in this article.
4.3. Path selection
Prior to communicate with another mesh router in the
network, the source constructs a message and labels it
with an SL which indicates the security requirements on
the requested route. The protocol checks whether the
SL satisfies the condition of assumption 3. If not, the
source must modify the SL and broadcast a PREQ (path
request) packet to its neighbors.
Then, when a mesh router y requests one of its neigh-
bors x for some service, the proposed novel reputation
scheme is carried out to decide whether to provide the
service. Let g Î [0.0, 1.0] be a threshold, if the expecta-
tion E(ωx:y) is larger than g, y will be considered as a
cooperative mesh router and the service request will be
granted by x. The detail of the decision mechanism is
described as follows.
1. y sends a Path_Request message to one of its
neighbors x.
2. After receiving Path_Request successfully, x per-
forms different formulae according to its type. If x is
trustworthy, it performs formula (I); if x is untrust-
worthy, it performs formula (II).
Formula (I):
(1) x retrieves its direct opinion ωdirx:y from its
local reputation table and calculates the expecta-
tion E(ωdirx:y ) .
(2) If E(ωdirx:y ) ≥ γ , x sends an Accept message to
y and provides the requested service, and y
records a positive interaction with x; else, x
invokes the reputation query procedure.
(a) x broadcasts a Reputation_Query to the com-
mon neighbor nodes with y for the their recom-
mending opinions on y and waits for a time
interval T.
(b) Any node k whose uncertainty udirk:y of its
direct opinion is less than 1.0 sends its direct
opinion ωdirk:y to x.
(c) After the time interval T, x weights each
received recommended opinions using (4), inte-
grates them into a recommended opinion ωrecx:y
using (5), and combines the direct opinion ωdirx:y
with the recommended opinion ωrecx:y using (6) or
(7). Finally, x obtains the final opinion ωfinalx:y .
(d) After obtaining the final opinion ωfinalx:y , x cal-
culates its expectation E(ωfinalx:y ) . If E(ω
final
x:y ) ≥ γ ,
x sends an Accept message to y and provides the
requested service, and y records a positive inter-
action with x; otherwise, x sends a Refuse mes-
sage to y, and y records a negative interaction
with x.
Formula (II):
Let θÎ[0.0, 1.0] be the probability that an untrust-
worthy mesh router cooperates in an attempt to hide its
untrustworthy intent. When x receives a request mes-
sage from y, then x flips a coin weighted by probability
θ.
(a) If the coin flip indicates to cooperate, x sends
an Accept message to y and provides the
requested service, and y records a positive inter-
action with x.
(b) If the coin flip indicates not to cooperate, x
refuses to provide service to y, and y records a
negative interaction with x.
3. If the expectation of a mesh router y, E(ωy) <g, y
is perceived as untrustworthy. It is temporarily
excluded from the network so that it is put into a
probation state and can be forced to cooperate. Initi-
ally the probation period is T, which is the same as
the period of reputation query. At the end of T, y is
given another chance to calculate its expectation E
(ωy), if E(ωy) is still less than g, then y is put into
another probation state for a longer period (2T).
Therefore, the probation period of an untrustworthy
mesh router is doubled on every subsequent offence
until it reaches a maximum value Tmax, then it is
permanently excluded from the network.
So far, the overall workflow of our proposed scheme is
completed. Untrustworthy wireless mesh routers in
WMNs are detected and isolated.
Finally, the intermediate trustworthy mesh routers
compare the value of SL from received PREQ with their
own SL’s. If the SL of an intermediate mesh router does
not meet the requirements of the SL in the original
PREQ, it cannot participate in the route discovery and
has to drop the PREQ. In other words, only mesh rou-
ters with higher SL can be used as a relay mesh router
by mesh routers with lower SL, but not vise versa. Each
mesh router can only retrieve parts of users’ private
information within the limit of its own SL. Without
being exposed the entire user’s identity when nonessen-
tial information is disclosed, the security of a user will
not be threatened. The user remains a certain level of
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anonymity and keeps its private information under the
umbrella. For example, if a package has a lowest security
requirement RESTRITED on a route, then any mesh
router in the WMNs has the qualification to participate
in the route discovery. In such situation, the path with
the shortest distance will be selected. If a package’s
security requirement is SECRET, then only the mesh
routers with higher SL such as SECRET or TOP
SECRET are allowed to relay it. When the PREQ
reaches the destination, the destination sends a PREP
back to the mesh router from which it received the
PREQ. The mesh router forwards the PREP packet, also
establishes a routing table entry for the destination, with
the offered route security associated.
With the MLS and uncertainty-based subjective logic
mechanisms PA-SHWMP is able to send packets with
various sensitivities via paths that implement corre-
sponding security guarantees. However, in order to
enforce the protocol working as designed and protect
the network against certain vulnerabilities, the link
security authentication mechanism is also needed.
In PA-SHWMP, Merkle Tree [22] is used to imple-
ment the link security by securing the mutable fields
that can be modified in the intermediate routers. Con-
sidering the scenario that a source S wants to communi-
cate with a destination X as shown in Figure 6, the
secure path selection process is carried out as Equations
(1)-(15) in [4].
As described in [4], the secure path selection process
includes on-demand and proactive modes. In the on-
demand mode, S first creates a Merkle tree whose leaves
are the hash of mutable fields of PREQ message and a
MAC on the root of the Merkle tree using the GTK.
Then, it broadcasts PREQ. Upon receiving the PREQ,
any neighbor mesh router authenticates the mutable
fields by hashing the values received in an ordered way,
creates a MAC on it using the shared GTK and com-
pares with the received MAC value of the root. If the
two values match, the mesh router, where the PREQ is
from, is authenticated. Finally, the mesh routers update
the mutable fields and create Merkle trees from the
modified fields. They also decrypt the non-mutable part
and re-encrypt it with their own broadcast key and
broadcast it following the same rules. After authenticat-
ing and receiving the PREQ, the destination updates the
mutable fields, creates Merkle Tree, and unicasts a
PREP message using the same principle with PTK in the
reverse path.
In the Proactive RANN mode, the broadcast message
RANN uses GTK to protect the non-mutable fields and
authenticate the mutable fields. After receiving the
RANN message, the MP that needs to setup a path to
the root MP unicasts a PREQ to the root MP. On
receiving each PREQ, the root MP replies with a PREP.
5. Security analysis
The security of the proposed routing protocol is based
on the subjective logic and MLS technology. The subjec-
tive logic-based reputation mechanism makes use of
querying the sender’s reputation through their common
neighbors and computing the expectation to decide
whether to provide services for incoming packets while
keeping the user privacy. On the other hand, the MLS
divides the user privacy information into different cate-
gories according to the security requirements. The mesh
router with a particular SL must only be allowed to
transmit packets and get user privacy information at the




















Figure 6 Secure path selection.
Lin et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2012, 2012:69
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/69
Page 10 of 16
the correct receiver without revealing any sensitive
information.
Equipped with protection features, the route messages
as well as the user privacy information are protected
from insiders. Packets and privacy information can only
be recognized by legitimate mesh routers and opened by
the expected destination mesh router.
In the following, we will discuss the security features
of our protocols, including Route disruption and diver-
sion attack, flooding attack, and impersonation attack.
Route disruption and diversion attack: route disruption
and diversion attack aims to prevent discovering route
between two legitimate mesh routers or divert traffic to
malicious mesh routers by modifying the mutable fields
in routing messages. A malicious mesh router can mod-
ify the metric field value to zero on the PREQ message
and re-broadcast it. After receiving the modified PREQ,
the destination mesh router will choose the malicious
mesh router as the next hop in the reverse path and
unicast PREP to the malicious mesh router. In this occa-
sion, the malicious mesh router can disrupt the route
discovery by dropping the valid PREP message destined
for the source mesh router and all traffic to the destina-
tion mesh router will be diverted through the attacker.
In PA-SHWMP, mutable fields in the routing informa-
tion are authenticated in each hop, and only mesh rou-
ters that meet the security requirement embedded in
the packets can participate in the route discovery phase.
If there is any malicious modification on the value of a
mutable field, it will be readily detected by the next hop
by comparing the new MAC with the received one and
the modified packet will be discarded. Also by encrypt-
ing certain fields at higher SL, read-up violation at the
malicious mesh routers with lower SL can be prevented
from interpreting the packets without higher-level key.
With these methods, it is impossible to launch a route
disruption and diversion attack that caused by the mali-
cious behavior of a mesh router through modification of
a mutable field and dropping routing information.
Flooding attack: Flooding attack aims to consume the
network bandwidth and degrade the overall throughput
by flooding the network with PREQ messages destined
to an address which is not present in the network. In
the sequel, intermediate mesh routers rebroadcast PREQ
and within a short time the network is flooded with fake
requests. In PA-SHWMP, participants only accept pack-
ets processed by a mesh router which meets the security
requirement and is considered to be trustworthy. More-
over, the packets are signed with a private key or a
group key. Therefore, a malicious mesh router cannot
participate in the routing process or initiate a route dis-
covery process with a destination address that is not in
the network. Again, as the routing information is
encrypted during transmission, a malicious mesh router
cannot insert a new destination address.
Impersonation attack: Only inside attackers can do
impersonation attack. If a mesh router is compromised,
the attacker can use the compromised privacy informa-
tion to masquerade as any other mesh client. In PA-
SHWMP, only the source and destination can sign with
its own private key, routers cannot spoof other routers
in route instantiation and ensure that only the destina-
tion can respond to route discovery. This prevents either
the source or the destination from spoofing.
6. Performance analysis
A typical WMN is characterized by low-power mobile
devices and low-bandwidth wireless channels. The per-
formance of routing protocols has a great impact on the
applicability and usability of a WMN. We implement
the PA-SHWMP in OPNET [25,26] and evaluate its per-
formance by comparing it with the SHWMP and
HWMP routing protocols. According to the scenario
defined in [4,22], the network scenario parameters used
in our simulation are listed in Table 2. In the simulation
scenario, a mesh network of size 1000 × 1000 m2 con-
sists of 50 wireless mesh routers that are deployed ran-
domly over the defined field. The mobile nodes are
moving in the field according to the random waypoint
model [26], and their average speeds range from 0 to 2
m/s. An omni-directional constant bit-rate (CBR) traffic
is generated for 5 to 10 random pairs to resemble point-
to-point communication in the real world. All protocols
are run under the identical traffic scenario.
We consider the following performance metrics:
• Packet delivery ratio (PDR): Ratio of the number of
data packets received at the destinations to the number
of data packets generated by the CBR sources. It in turn
Table 1 Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Traffic type CBR
Simulation area 1000 × 1000 m2
Packet rate 2 packets/s
Total number of wireless nodes 50
Maximum number of malicious nodes 25
Simulation time 900 s
Packet size 1024/512 bytes
Base rate a 0.5
Variation δ 0.1
Weight factor b 0.5
Maximum cooperation rate of selfish nodes θ 0.3
Threshold g 0.6
Reputation query period T 5 s
Isolation time Tmax 20 s
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determines the efficiency of the protocol to discover
routes successfully.
• Path acquisition delay: Time required to establish a
route from source to destination which actually mea-
sures the delay between sending a PREQ/proactive
PREQ to a destination and the receipt of corresponding
PREP.
• End-to-end delay: Average delay experienced by a
data packet from a source to destination. Note that,
end-to-end delay includes all the delays including med-
ium access delay, processing delays at intermediate
mesh routers, etc.
• False positive rate: It is defined as the percentage of
number of cooperative mesh routers wrongly detected
as selfish or malicious out of the total number of coop-
erative mesh routers in the network. It is desirable for
this rate to be as small as possible.
• Convergence time: Another factor of interest is con-
vergence time, which is the time for cooperative wireless
mesh routers to detect and throttle selfish or malicious
wireless mesh routers completely. It is desirable for this
time to be as small as possible.
Simulations have been run over ten times with ran-
dom seeds. The performance metrics used in our pro-
posed scheme are then collected and averaged. To
ensure a valid comparison, the sequence of random
seeds is the same and the only variation is the choice of
parameters.
We first evaluate the performance of detecting mali-
cious routers by measuring the PDR. Figure 7 shows the
average PDR of PA-SHWMP compared with SHWMP
and HWMP with different numbers of malicious rou-
ters. As depicted in Figure 7, the performance of net-
work decreases as the number of malicious routers
increases. When there are no malicious routers in the
network, the PDR of PA-SHWMP is slightly lower than
SHWMP and HWMP due to the detection overhead. As
the number of malicious routers increases, the PDR of
PA-SHWMP decreases more slowly than that of
SHWMP and HWMP attributed to more accurate node
isolation due to the reconfirmation procedure. It should
be noted that when the number of malicious routers
increases beyond 15, the performance improvement
shown by the detection scheme starts to decline. The
difference between the three protocols becomes smaller
and smaller. The reason is that the higher the ratio of
malicious routers, the more legitimate mesh routers are
left unreachable from the mesh gateway and the fewer
alternatives are available for choosing forwarding paths.
Figures 8 and 9 compare the average end-to-end delay
and average path acquisition delay of the three proto-
cols. We run the simulation using five and ten source-
destination pairs. As shown in Figures 8 and 9, under
light or medium traffic loads and less hops, the delay is
less than 200 ms, whereas under heavy traffic loads and
more hops, the delay reaches to nearly 300 ms. Further-
more, both the end-to-end delay and the average path
acquisition delay of PA-SHWMP are much higher than
SHWMP and HWMP. The lower performance of the
PA-SHWMP is due to two facts: (1) Heavy traffic loads
result in more frequent and serious congestion and sig-
nal interference in the network. Packets get lost or
dropped more easily. (2) More hops results in more pro-
cessing time for computing the values of reputation and
SL as well as doing the link security authentication to
verify the authenticity of a received packet.
Figure 10 illustrates the effect of poor quality links on
performance by simulating some wireless links in the
network to perform poorly, which could happen in real
life due to wireless network characteristics. The
Figure 7 PDR comparison in the presence of malicious mesh routers.
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forwarding ratio of the poor quality links ranges from
0.4 to 0.6. In the simulation, we varied the number of
lossy wireless links and examined the number of false
positives that can be explained by the packet loss caused
by congestions. From the simulation results, we can see
that when the number of lossy links increases, the false
positive rates of both SHWMP and HWMP increase,
while the false positive rate of PA-SHWMP decreases.
Figure 8 Average end-to-end delay.
Figure 9 Average path acquisition delay.
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The reason is that poor quality link causes a lot of pack-
ets loss, neither SHWMP nor HWMP has mechanisms
to differentiate between intentional packet drops and
packet drops due to link quality, thus their packet losses
due to link quality are falsely detected as misbehavior,
which increases their false positive rates. On the con-
trary, PA-SHWMP can effectively differentiate the
packet losses due to link quality.
Figure 11 compares the three protocols in terms of
PDR. As shown in Figure 11, with the increase in the
percentage of lossy links, the PDR values of the three
protocols decrease and the decrease of PA-SHWMP is
smoother than the other two protocols. The reason is
that both SHWMP and HWMP falsely detect certain
mesh routers as malicious due to their poor wireless
links, with the increase in the percentage of lossy links,
an increasing number of legitimate mesh routers are
excluded from the network, which results in a rapidly
decreasing PDR for both SHWMP and HWMP.
Finally, we compare the convergence time used to iso-
late malicious mesh routers. In the simulation, the para-
meter θ is set to be 0.3; so, malicious mesh routers can
hide their misbehaviors to a certain degree. As we can
observe from Figure 12, convergence times of the three
Figure 10 Comparison of false positive rate as a function of link quality.
Figure 11 Comparison of PDR as a function of link quality.
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protocols raise as the percentage of malicious mesh rou-
ters increases. Moreover, convergence time of PA-
SHWMP is smaller than the other two protocols under
any specific percentage of malicious mesh routers. As
the percentage of malicious mesh routers increases, the
reliable information used for calculating the reputation
values becomes less, causing the isolation of more mali-
cious mesh routers, which leads to more broken for-
warding routings. Thus, cooperative mesh routers have
to spend more time to discover other malicious mesh
routers. Due to the introduction of weight factor f and
the reconfirmation scheme of malicious mesh routers,
the proposed PA-SHWMP scheme can calculate reputa-
tion values and isolate malicious mesh routers more
accurately. As a result, its convergence time also has a
large improvement as shown in Figure 12.
7. Conclusions
In this article, we have investigated the problem of privacy
preserving routing in WMNs and proposed a routing pro-
tocol, called PA-SHWMP to provide privacy protection
and security in WMNs. PA-SHWMP is based on subjec-
tive logic and MLS technology and consists of three
phases: (1) security classification and reputation computa-
tion; (2) packet authentication; (3) routing confidentiality.
Relying on the hybrid usage of reputation mechanism and
user privacy information classification mechanism, PA-
SHWMP can provide scalable security services to assure
the authenticity, integrity, and secrecy of routing packets
and defend against the internal attacks caused by compro-
mised mesh routers. Detailed security analysis and perfor-
mance evaluation demonstrate that the proposed PA-
SHWMP is secure, privacy preserving, and efficient. More
specifically, the simulation results show that the PDR of
the proposed PA-SHWMP becomes better than that of
the existing HWMP and SHWMP protocols, when the
number of malicious nodes and the percentage of lossy
links increase. In addition, the convergence time of PA-
SHWMP is smaller than HWMP and SHWMP with any
percentage of malicious mesh routers.
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